Reducing the minimum assumptions needed to construct various cryptographic primitives is an important a n d i n teresting task in theoretical cryptography. Oblivious Transfer, one of the most basic cryptographic building blocks, is also studied under this scenario. Reducing the minimum assumptions for Oblivious Transfer seems not an easy task, as there are a few impossibility results under black-box reductions.
Introduction

Oblivious Transfer
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is an important t wo-party cryptographic protocol. The rst known OT system was introduced by Rabin 24] in 1981 where a message is received with probability 1/2 and the sender cannot know whether his message reaches the receiver. Prior to this, Wiesner 25] introduced a primitive c a l l e d m ultiplexing, which i s e q u i v alent to the 1-out-of-2 OT 10] known today, but it was then not seen as a tool in cryptography. In 1985, Even et al. de ned the 1-out-of-2 OT 10] , where the sender has two secrets 0 and 1 and the receiver can choose one of them in an oblivious manner.
That is, the sender cannot know the receiver's choice i 2 f0 1g and the receiver cannot know a n y information on 1;i . The former property is called receiver's privacy and the latter sender's privacy. Later, Cr epeau 6] showed that Rabin's OT and the 1-out-of-2 OT are equivalent. Furthermore, the more general 1-out-of-N OT (where the sender has N secrets), the more speci c 1-out-of-2 bit OT (where the secrets are one bit long), are similarly de ned and the reductions among the variants of OT have beendiscussed in the literature, e.g. 3, 4, 8] .
OT protocols are fundamental building blocks of modern cryptography. Most notably, it is known that any multi-party secure computation can be b a s e d o n O T 2 0 , 2 8 ] . By simple arguments it can be seen that, in 1-out-of-2 OT, either sender's privacy or receiver's privacy must be protected by s o m e computational assumptions, where the other party m a y be protected in the information theoretic sense. The symmetry of 1-out-of-2 bit OT 26] implies that we h a ve the freedom to choose which side to protect in which w ay when we are given a protocol.
Various implementations of OT protocols have been proposed, and they are all based on some computational assumptions. As an e cient implementation, Naor and Pinkas has proposed a protocol 22] based on Di e and Hellman 9] type of problems.
Complexity Assumptions of OT
We are interested to know the minimum computational assumptions necessary for building OT. Unavoidably, for each OT protocol proposed, we m a y have to rely on some unproven computational assumptions for its security. To some extent, this is acceptable, since most cryptographic protocols imply the existence of one-way functions 18], which in particular implies P 6 = N P .
On the other hand, since it may be impossible to avoid all the computational assumptions, we w ould like to construct protocols based upon as weak assumptions as possible. In any cryptographic protocol, less underlying assumptions means more con dence on the security. Therefore, the study of minimum computational assumptions of various cryptographic primitives is an important part in cryptographic research. For example, while oneway permutation is known to imply statistically-hiding commitment 21], this assumption has been reduced in 15]. And nally, Haitner and Reingold 16] recently proved that statistically-hiding commitment can be constructed from any one-way function. That enables us to rely on one-way functions to use zero-knowledge arguments.
The situation for OT is more complicated. From the discussion in 17], it is known that OT can be based on one-way functions if there exists a witness retrievable compression algorithm for some type of SAT formulas. But on the other hand, the combination of the oracle separation 19] between one-way permutations and key agreement and the construction 2, 24] of key agreements from OT suggests that black-box reductions from OT to oneway functions are impossible. In general, it is believed that it will be very di cult, if not impossible, to build OT with one-way functions only.
In the original paper of 10], trapdoor permutations with some extra properties are used to construct OT. In 13], Haitner proposed a similar protocol which in theory reduced the computational assumptions required by 10]. The protocol uses a collection of dense trapdoor permutations. In 23], another construction of 10] is made from a new type of trapdoor functions (called lossy trapdoor functions) with some speci c properties. However, the de nition comes rather from concrete problems such as the Di e-Hellman problem and lattice problems than from the theoretical origin.
In this paper, we focus on two issues. We explore the possibility to further reduce the computational assumptions of OT as stated in 13]. We like t o know if trapdoor functions, rather than trapdoor permutations, can be used to construct OT. Also, we investigate the essential properties of trapdoor functions that is necessary for OT. For example, Bellare et al. showed that many-to-one trapdoor functions with super-polynomial preimage size can be constructed from one-way functions 1]. This fact says that many-to-one trapdoor functions with polynomial pre-image size may have very di erent properties from those of super-polynomial pre-image size. It also suggests that OT may not be constructible from many-to-one trapdoor functions with super-polynomial pre-image size.
While public key encryptions can be constructed from many-to-one trapdoor functions with polynomial pre-image size as stated in 1], there exists an oracle separation in 11] between public key encryptions and OT. Thus, it is natural to ask whether OT can be constructed from many-to-one trapdoor functions with polynomial pre-image size.
As the main result of this paper, we show that the protocol of 13] can be improved to make it applicable to general trapdoor functions. The permutation property is thus not essential. This fact is actually discussed in the concluding remarks of 13]. But the trapdoor functions used in our protocol have some extra properties with respect to pre-image size and length expansion, and we argue that these extra properties are necessary and are close to the minimum in black-box reductions. Consequently, we have an OT construction based on a weaker assumption than the previous results.
Preliminaries 2.1 Semi-honest Model
We limit ourselves to the semi-honest model in our OT protocol. In a semihonest protocol, all parties are assumed to follow the protocol properly, except that they may try to extract extra information from the communications, possibly by performing some computations afterwards. In 12] it is shown that a protocol for semi-honest model can be used to construct an equivalent protocol in the general malicious model, where nothing is assumed about the parties. In 14], it is shown that such a construction can bedone in the black-box way, where the semi-honest protocol is used as a black-box.
These known constructions of protocols for the malicious model from the semi-honest model are based on commitment schemes and zero-knowledge proofs. Regarding to complexity assumptions, they also require the existence of one-way functions. Using the combination of these results, we can obtain OT in the general model simply by constructing a semi-honest OT protocol.
1-out-of-2 Bit OT
In this paper, we consider only the 1-out-of-2 bit OT in the semi-honest model. It is known that other versions of OT can beconstructed using 1-out-of-2 bit OT as building blocks. The sender has two secret bits ( 0 1 ) and the receiver has a choice bit i. In the correct output, the receiver will get i and not 1;i , where the sender will get no information about i. More formally, let V S ( 0 1 i ) and V R ( i 1;i i ) be the random variables for the sender's and receiver's view of the protocol respectively, given the receiver's choice i and the sender's secrets 0 and 1 . Note that the notation of V R ( i 1;i i ) is informal because the order of parameters is not xed. This is not a problem because the receiver always knows i and the order of the other two parameters are decided accordingly. The privacy properties of OT The standard de nition of OT above requires that bothparties are at least protected computationally. Nonetheless, in an OT system, it is known that at most one party's privacy can beperfectly protected in information theoretic sense. In that case, even if the other party is computationally unbounded, the rst party's privacy is still maintained. On the other hand, as it is impossible to protect both parties perfectly, some computational assumptions must be introduced.
In our basic protocol, the receiver's privacy is protected in information theoretic sense. It is compatible with the standard de nition, and our analysis is much simpli ed by the information theoretic arguments. 1 A negligible function of n, denoted by neg(n), is de ned as a function of n where jneg(n)j < j 1 g(n) j for any polynomial g(n), for large enough n.
Weak OT
A Weak OT protocol (WOT) is a relaxed version of OT. The weakness is described by three parameters. I n a ( 1 2 3 )-WOT, the secret required by the receiver is only guaranteed to pass correctly with a probability no less than 1 ; 1 . This is called the correctness of the protocol. On the other hand, the receiver does not gain more computational advantage about 1;i than 2 , and the sender does not gain more computational advantage about i than 3 . Similar to the normal OT, we h a ve: Note that, under our de nition, a (neg(n) n e g (n) n e g (n))-WOT is equal to OT, in either the semi-honest model or the general model.
Pairwise Independent Hash Functions
Let H n beafamily of functions where the length of input l 1 and length of output l 2 are both in polynomial in n. From 5] it is well known that, for any choice of l 1 and l 2 , there exists an e cient family of pairwise independent hash functions H n with the following properties.
1. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm to sample h 2 H n uniformly.
2. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm to evaluate h(x) given h and x 2 f 0 1g l 1 .
3. When h is uniformly sampled, for every distinct x 1 x 2 2 f 0 1g l 1 and every y 1 y 2 2 f 0 1g l 2 , Pr h(x 1 ) = y 1^h (x 2 ) = y 2 ] = 1 2 2l 2 :
3 TrapdoorFunctions for OT
In this paper we are constructing OT based on a special type of trapdoor function. We rst de ne the normal trapdoor function, and add some extra restrictions suitable for our purpose. At the same time, we t r y t o minimize the assumptions we m a k e.
Collection of Dense Trapdoor Functions
In general, a collection of (non-injective) trapdoor functions F n , where n is the security parameter, have the following properties:
1. There exists an e cient algorithm which uniformly selects a function f in F n , represented by , and generates the trapdoor t at the same time.
Denote the domain of the function by D . If x 2 D then f (x) can
be computed e ciently.
3. Without the trapdoor t, for a uniformly chosen x 2 D , when given f (x) it is computationally infeasible to obtain any x 0 2 D such t h a t f (x 0 ) = f (x).
4. For any x 2 D , g i v en f (x) a n d t, there exist an e cient algorithm to nd one x 0 2 D such that f (x 0 ) = f (x). That is, we c a n calculate x 0 = f ;1 (t y) where y = f (x 0 ), if in the rst place y = f (x) for some x in the domain.
The Extra Properties
In this paper, in order to construct our OT protocol, we require the trapdoor functions to have a few more properties. We list them here and call them the Five Extra Properties, in order to distinguish our trapdoor functions from the general ones.
1. Without loss of generality, w e assume D f 0 1g n . For all x 2 f 0 1g n we assume f (x) can be evaluated using the same algorithm evaluating the function, and the algorithm will halt in polynomial time, producing some output. That is, even if x = 2 D we assume the algorithm will still run and produce a string as output. As we do not assume that the algorithm can detect the fact of x = 2 D , w e assume nothing about the output string.
2. For all y 2 f 0 1g m , the function f ;1 (t y) can be evaluated using the same algorithm evaluating the inverse function, and the algorithm will halt in polynomial time, producing some output. The idea is similar to Property 1 above.
3. There exist a polynomial p(n) such that, for all , the set D is dense in f0 1g n . That is, jD j 2 n > 1 p(n) :
4. For all x 2 D we have f (x) 2 f0 1g m for some xed m = n + O(log n). That is, the expansion (in terms of the length of strings) of the function is in order of log n. This assumption can berelaxed slightly that only a majority o f x 2 D have this property. To be more precise, as long as those x 2 D having this property are dense in D , they are also dense in f0 1g n due to Property 3 above. In that case we can restrict the domain of the trapdoor function to this new set of x, without a ecting any other property of the trapdoor function.
5. For any , when x 2 D and y = f (x), the number of pre-images of y is bounded by a polynomial. That is, there exist a polynomial q(n) that, for all and y, I y = fx 2 D : f (x) = yg (7) jI y j q(n): (8) 
Reasons for Extra Properties
Among the Five Extra Properties, Property 1 and 2 are general clari cations and may beassumed to betrue anyway. Property 3 is adopted from 13], and we nd that in our protocol it is still necessary in order to sample the elements in the function domain. Property 4, the expansion property, is related to 11], which p r o ves that OT cannot be black-box reduced to public key encryption or trapdoor function without any assumption. The proof is constructed relative to a world with a PSPACE-complete oracle. In this world one special trapdoor function exists, but OT does not exist. The special trapdoor function is lengthexpanding in O(n). The length-expanding property of this trapdoor function makes it di cult to sample valid images of the function without knowing the pre-image.
Note that OT can be reduced to public key encryption if it is possible to sample its valid ciphertexts, separately from the corresponding plaintexts. Therefore, the impossibility results are shown relative t o a w orld where the only public key encryption does not have this property.
As OT cannot be black-box reduced to trapdoor functions which is length-expanding in O(n), we attempt to build the OT with a trapdoor function which is at most length-expanding in O(log n).
Property 5, the pre-image property, is due to 1], where non-injective trapdoor functions are studied. In 1], a trapdoor function with exponential pre-image size is black-box constructed from a one-way function. On the other hand, it is known that OT cannot beblack-box reduced to one-way function 19]. This, combined with the recent results of black-box construction of OT from semi-honest OT 14] , implies that semi-honest OT cannot be black-box constructed from a trapdoor function with exponential pre-image size.
In 1], it is also shown that a trapdoor function with polynomial preimage size is su cient to construct public key encryption. Therefore, we are motivated to build our OT protocol with a trapdoor function of polynomial pre-image size.
The Protocol
The construction of our OT protocol is similar to 13], that a semi-honest Weak OT protocol is rst constructed. After that, the process to enhance it to a semi-honest OT is exactly the same as 13].
First of all, we select a collection of pairwise independent hash functions H n with domain f0 1g n and range f1 2 : : : g (n)p(n)q(n)g where g(n) > 1 is a polynomial of our choice which will be discussed in the next two sections.
The sender has secret bits ( 0 1 ) and the receiver has the choice bit i. The protocol is:
1. The sender uniformly selects a trapdoor function ( t) and a hash function h 2 H n .
2. The sender sends (h ) to the receiver.
3. The receiver selects uniformly s 2 f0 1g n and calculates f (s). If f (s) = 2 f 0 1g m another s is selected iteratively until f (s) 2 f 0 1g m . After that the receiver sets r i = f (s) and selects uniformly r 1;i 2 f0 1g m .
4. The receiver sends fr 0 r 1 g in random order to the sender. f ;1 (t r j ) 2 f 0 1g n (9) f (f ;1 (t r j )) = r j : (10) If the answer is negative, the sender aborts the current iteration and restarts the protocol. Otherwise the protocol continues with the sender setting for j = 0 1 v j = h(f ;1 (t r j )):
6. The sender sends fv 0 v 1 g in the same order as he received fr 0 r 1 g from the receiver before.
7. Receiver checks that v i = h(s). If the result is negative, the current iteration aborts and the protocol is restarted. Otherwise, the receiver reveals the true order of (r 0 r 1 ) to the sender. From here, both r 0 and r 1 are thought to be good candidates as the keys in the OT protocol.
The receiver is thought t o k n o w the pre-image of exactly one of them, where the sender does not know which one.
8. For both j = 0 1 the sender chooses y j 2 f 0 1g n uniformly and sets c j = j b(f ;1 (t r j ) y j ) (12) where b(x y) is the inner product of x y modulus 2, a hardcore predicate.
9. The sender sends (c 0 c 1 y 0 y 1 ) to the receiver.
10. The receiver outputs 0 i = b(s y i ) c i . This is the secret required.
Analysis of Protocol
To m a k e analysis easier, we de ne the following sets before we proceed.
where R is the range of the trapdoor function. Also, there is a one-to-one relationship between D 0 and R . Next, we de ne the following sets, acting as an extension of the domain of the trapdoor function.
D 00 = fx 2 f 0 1g n : x = f ;1 (t f (x))^f (x) 2 f 0 1g m g (15) R 00 = f (D 00 ):
Naturally, there is also a one-to-one relationship between elements in D 00 and R 00 . Also we see that D 0 = D \ D 00 .
Running Time
Observe that, due to the dense property o f D in f0 1g n and D 0 in D , D 0 is also dense in f0 1g n . As jD 0 j = jR j and m = n + O(log n), R is dense in f0 1g m . To be more precise, in our protocol we h a ve
for some constant c.
In an iteration, if s 2 D 0 and r 1;i 2 R then the protocol will reach the end successfully. It is easy to see that the total expected number of iterations is polynomial in n. Thus, we s a y t h e protocol runs in expected polynomial time. To be precise, in order to guarantee that the protocol will come to a halt, we need to set a counter for the number of iterations. The protocol is terminated when the counter exceeds some predetermined number. In this case, the running time will be polynomial, while the weakness parameter for correctness in WOT will be increased by a negligible amount. Also, we see how the properties of the trapdoor function a ect the running of the protocol. Both the expansion property and pre-image property a ect the density of usable elements in the domain and range of the trapdoor function. Here they are required for the running time to be polynomial.
Correctness
With the discussion above, the protocol will be prematurely terminated with a negligible probability. If this does not happen, the protocol is executed to the last step. In the last iteration of the protocol, the receiver can get the required secret correctly if s = f ;1 (t r i ).
Failure occurs if s 6 = f ;1 (t r i ) and at the same time h(s) = v i . It is independent o f t h e c hoice of r 1;i , e v en though r 1;i may lead to an absorbed round. For probability w e write:
Pr(s = f ;1 (t r i )) > 1 p(n)q(n) (19) Pr(s 6 = f ;1 (t r i )^h(s) = v i ) < (1 ; 1 p(n)q(n) )( > 1 ; 1 g(n) (21) as p(n) 1 and q(n) 1. This gives the required result that 1 < 1=g(n).
If we also consider the minor case that the protocol may not run through the end, we h a ve 1 < 1=g(n) + neg(n).
Privacy of Receiver
First of all we argue that, when s = f ;1 (t r i ), we h a ve s 2 D 00 . On the other hand, r 1;i 2 R 00 if the protocol is run through the end in an iteration. Due to the one-to-one relation between elements of D 00 and R 00 , w e conclude in this case that both r 0 and r 1 will appear uniformly distributed in R 00 , protecting the privacy of the receiver. As a result, the weakness parameter for receiver's privacy is bounded by the same events that determine correctness, and thus
Privacy of Sender
The main weakness of the Weak OT protocol is on the sender's privacy.
After all, r 0 and r 1 are nally not even guaranteed to bein R . We can assume nothing about the computational hardness of inverting function f in that case.
But if r 1;i 2 R , the sender's privacy is maintained. In this case it is easy to see that, if the receiver has non-negligible advantage in guessing 1;i then he also has non-negligible advantage in getting f ;1 (t r 1;i ), in violation of our computational assumption. p(n)q(n)n c (22) where we see that the privacy of sender depends on all the special properties of our trapdoor function: the dense property p(n), the pre-image property q(n) and expansion property c. 6 Strengthening the Weak OT As a result, we have a ( 1 g(n) + neg(n) 1 ; 1 t(n) 1 g(n) )-WOT, where t(n) = p(n)q(n)n c . In general, it is possible to strengthen a Weak OT 27] to a standard OT under some conditions, within either the semi-honest model or general model. For our protocol, the construction in 13] can be used, which involves a technique from 7] . The details of the process can be seen in the Appendix of this paper.
